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Summary
Ninety-seven major military bases were recommended for closure and
realignment by the 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995 base realignment and closure (BRAC)
commissions.  Only two of these BRAC recommendations remain uncompleted at this
time.  Action on all 451 installations (major and minor) from the first four rounds is
expected to be completed by the end of FY2001, as scheduled.  The Department of
Defense has estimated that these closures and realignments will produce net savings
of about $14 billion dollars by the end of FY2001, and estimated annual savings
thereafter of about $5.7 billion.
In mid-1997, Secretary of Defense William Cohen called for two new rounds of
base closures and realignments.  He explained that, while four previous rounds had
achieved significant savings, it was important to continue the process of closing
underutilized facilities.  Despite DOD pressure, most Members of Congress were
reluctant to support authorization of new base closure legislation, at least for the
foreseeable future.  The reasons given included, among others, grass-roots opposition
from communities likely to be affected and President Clinton’s “intervention” in the
1995 base closure commission’s recommendations regarding McClellan and Kelly air
force bases.  Of the two chambers, the House of Representatives expressed the
stronger and more united opposition.  In the Senate, proponents of new base closure
rounds attempted to attach an amendment to the FY1999 defense authorization bill,
but failed. 
The base closing issue, however, was revived again at the outset of the 106th
Congress.  Proponents believed that their cause would be helped by the fact that it
was not an election year.  On January 20, 1999, Sen. John McCain, along with Sen.
Carl Levin and Sen. Charles Robb, introduced legislation (S. 258) that would
authorize two new rounds of base closures in 2001 and 2003. On February 1, the
Clinton Administration submitted to Congress its budget for FY2000 which included
provision for two more rounds in 2001 and 2005.  On May 12 and 13, however, the
Senate Armed Services Committee, in its markup of the FY2000 defense
authorization bill (S. 1059), rejected proposals by Sen. John McCain and Sen. Carl
Levin to include authority for new base closings.  The two Senators attempted to
revive the new base closure proposal during floor debate on S. 1059 but met with
defeat by a vote of 60 to 40.  
In the following year, Sen. McCain and Sen. Levin once again assumed the lead
in calling for two new base closure rounds in 2003 and 2005.  On June 7, 2000,
however, their amendment to the FY2001 defense authorization bill was defeated on
the floor by a vote of 35 to 63.   The positions of the opposing sides in the debate
reflected the same concerns expressed in previous years.  With the advent of the new
Bush Administration, proponents of new base closure rounds may have an increased
chance of success, as the issue will be deliberated by Congress in a less politicized
climate than at any time in the past five years.      
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1For context and background, see CRS Report 97-305, Military Base Closures: A Brief
Historical Review since 1988, by George Siehl, 16 p.  
2“Realignment” is an action quite distinct from “closure.”  It involves transferring units and
functions, in and/or out of an installation, whereby the result is a net reduction of DOD
civilian personnel.  “Closure” involves shutting down or relocating most, if not all, of an
installation’s mission.  Small portions of the base may be retained for use by reserve
components. 
Military Base Closures:
Time for Another Round?
Introduction1
This report discusses key base closure developments, beginning with the 105th
Congress and continuing up to the present 107th Congress.  The most recent notable
action has been the Senate’s rejection (June 7, 2000) of a floor amendment  sponsored
by Sen. John McCain and Sen. Carl Levin to authorize new closure rounds.  Although
the base closures issue has remained relatively dormant during the past five years,
2001 promises to be a far more active year. The Department of Defense is likely to
press Members of Congress even harder than it has in the past to authorize the
establishment of a new, independent base closure commission. 
Of 97 major military bases recommended to be closed or realigned by the 1988,
1991, 1993, and 1995 base realignment and closure (BRAC) commissions, no more
than two remain open.2  Action on all 451 installations (major and minor) from the
first four rounds is expected to be completed by the end of FY2001, as scheduled.
The Department of Defense has estimated that these closures and realignments will
produce net savings of about $14 billion by the end of FY2001, and estimated annual
savings thereafter of about $5.7 billion.  
It was widely acknowledged, at the time of the 1995 round, that additional base
closures would be necessary, given the continuing downward trend in defense
spending and force structure (units and personnel).   Two years later, the Department
of Defense began to press its case in earnest.  On May 19, 1997, Secretary of Defense
William Cohen released a long awaited report, the Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR).  In the report, a major review of military strategy and capabilities, he called
for two more rounds of closures, one in 1999 and the second in 2001.  He explained
that, in spite of four previous rounds, the downsizing of DOD’s base structure had
fallen behind the downsizing of its force structure.  He pointed out that: 
Since the first base closure round, force structure has come down by 33% and will
have declined by a total of 36% when we finish the reductions under the QDR.
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During the same period, we will have reduced domestic infrastructure by 21%....
We must shed more weight.3
He further explained that closing more bases was dictated not only by the need
to achieve a proper balance between infrastructure and force structure, but also by the
need to secure significant savings that would allow DOD to fund adequately future
readiness and weapons acquisition programs.  He stated that without the savings from
new rounds of closing, DOD would be hard-pressed to fulfill its missions and
responsibilities in the future.
Closures and the 105th Congress
Secretary of Defense Cohen’s plan to begin new rounds of closures within the
next five years was met with a decided lack of enthusiasm on Capitol Hill.  Many
Members expressed deep concern over the likely economic and political fallout in
their districts from any such new rounds.  Both defense committees of the House and
Senate, during their mark-ups of the FY1998 DOD authorization bills, declined to
support new base closure legislation.  On June 12, 1997, the Senate Armed Services
Committee narrowly failed, on a 9-9 vote, to approve a proposal to authorize two
more rounds of base closing in 1999 and 2001.  The next day, Sen. Carl Levin, the
committee’s ranking Democrat, along with Sen. John McCain, Sen. Dan Coats, and
Sen. Charles Robb, pledged to push for more base closings when the DOD
authorization bill went to the floor.  Sen. Levin said that, if Congress was serious
about having funds for new weapons, it was necessary to reduce excess infrastructure.
On July 9, the full Senate voted 66-33 against the McCain-Levin initiative and
in support of a substitute amendment that delayed any new base closings until DOD
developed “accounting techniques” to accurately measure the costs and savings from
previous and future rounds.  Under the substitute amendment, sponsored by Sen.
Byron Dorgan, Sen. Trent Lott, and Sen. Tom Daschle, DOD was required to prepare
and submit its cost/savings report to Congress “in a timely manner.”  Although no
specific date was set, the provision stipulated that the report must be completed with
adequate time for Congress to authorize another round of base closings in 2001.
In the House National Security Committee, opposition to a new round of
closures was considerably stronger.  Rep. Joel Hefley, chairman of the subcommittee
on military installations, indicated that there should be no new base closure rounds for
at least five years.  He, as well as others,  questioned DOD’s estimate of actual
savings, especially in the short- and medium-term, given the substantial up-front costs
of shutting down bases.  Although DOD officials have claimed net savings, beginning
in FY1996 and increasing into the future, the Congressional Budget Office, in a
December 1996 report, stated that it was unable to confirm or assess those estimates.4
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Congressional opponents, further, objected to rushing into new rounds of
closures “without a complete and thorough understanding of the military implications”
of previous rounds.  In this regard, they also questioned the validity of DOD’s major
premise that there should be a one-to-one correlation between the percentage of
reduction in end-strength and in base closings.
Despite the lack of broad support on Capitol Hill, senior DOD officials, as well
as the President, continued to press for new rounds of base closures in the near future.
Both Secretary of Defense Cohen and retiring Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Gen. John Shalikashvili, issued statements in September 1997 calling for more base
closures as a way of making funds available for top priority weapons programs.  On
November 10, the Secretary of Defense and other senior Pentagon officials announced
a series of reforms  (“Defense Reform Initiative”) that included two additional rounds
of base closures in 2001 and 2005.  These rounds, it was asserted, would eventually
result in annual savings of about $1.4 billion each, or a total of $2.8 billion.  This
figure represented about half of the overall $6 billion annual savings anticipated from
DRI actions that include, in addition to base closings, increased outsourcing to private
industry, shifting to paperless contracting, administration, and publishing, and
reducing the number of personnel employed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense
and other agencies, departments, and activities.
Further support for two, or more, new rounds of base closures came from the
December 1997 report entitled Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st
Century.5   Members of the DOD-sponsored National Defense Panel that prepared the
report strongly urged Congress and the Defense Department to “move quickly to
restore the base realignment and closure process.”  They called for closures to begin
“earlier than the current 2001-2005 department proposal.”  In his endorsement of the
panel’s findings, Secretary of Defense Cohen emphasized, as he had in the past, the
importance of two additional BRAC rounds as a means of financing and accelerating
the transformation of U.S. military capabilities.
Dispute over Depot Privatization
A highly contentious aspect of the base closure debate involved President
Clinton’s actions concerning the last of the four rounds.  The 1995 base closure
commission had recommended the closing of two of the Air Force’s five major
maintenance depots -- at McClellan Air Force Base (CA) and Kelly Air Force Base
(TX).  The recommendation had been justified on the grounds that all five depots
were operating at under 50% capacity, and that significant savings could be achieved
by transferring McClellan’s and Kelly’s workload to the three remaining depots in
Utah, Oklahoma, and Georgia.6
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President Clinton vigorously opposed closing McClellan and Kelly depots,
arguing that California and Texas had already suffered disproportionately from effects
of the three previous closure rounds.  He moved quickly and forcefully to prevent
further loss of jobs in California and Texas by directing that private firms be allowed
to assume the work on site -- otherwise known as “privatization-in-place.”
Opponents of the President, however, were quick to charge him with unprecedented
political meddling in the base closing process.  They accused him of trying to curry
favor with the people of vote-rich California and Texas, vital in his bid for reelection.
Not surprisingly, legislators from Oklahoma, Georgia, and Utah vociferously
opposed the privatization plan, believing that  it deprived their local populations of
jobs that would have been otherwise created  under the initial recommendation of the
1995 base closure commission. Also, they knew that the existing privatization plan,
if permitted to proceed, left their depots highly vulnerable to closure whenever the
next round of base reductions occurred.
Resentment over President Clinton’s 1995 intervention persisted until the end
of his second term.  His action was repeatedly cited by congressional opponents as
reason for their opposition to any new base closure rounds.  It also fueled a move by
some Members to block DOD from proceeding with plans to privatize depot
maintenance work at McClellan and Kelly air force bases.  On June 5, 1997, the
House military readiness subcommittee approved an amendment to the FY1998
defense authorization bill prohibiting privatization at the two depots unless the
Secretary of Defense certified that the three remaining depots were operating at an
efficient 80% capacity.  These other depots, as mentioned above, were operating at
approximately 50% capacity.  The full House National Security Committee approved
the measure on June 16.  Similar depot language was approved by the full Senate
Armed Services Committee on June 17.  However, in the face of a threatened
filibuster by the four Senators representing California and Texas, the depot-related
provisions were removed from the DOD authorization bill prior to floor
consideration.  
In floor debate, on June 23, 1997, Rep. Terry Everett led an effort to delete the
depot-related restrictions in the House FY1998 defense authorization bill, but to no
avail.  His amendment was defeated by a vote of 145 to 278.  In the other chamber,
Sen. Inhofe spearheaded an effort to restore depot-restrictions to the Senate bill.  He
and his co-sponsors, however, withdrew their amendment on July 11, just before its
floor consideration. 
In conference committee, the depot-related language in the House bill became
a major bone of contention and obstacle to reaching final agreement on the FY1998
defense authorization bill.  As of early October, it was reportedly the only remaining
issue to be resolved.  Neither of the opposing camps seemed willing to yield -- with
one side threatening filibuster and/or veto if public-private depot competition at
McClellan and Kelly air force bases were not allowed to go forward, and the other
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side insisting that without language prohibiting depot competition, there would be no
bill.  A resolution was achieved, ultimately, by the Senate and House conferees and
reported on October 23. Under the compromise agreement, the limit on depot work
that could be done by private contractors was increased from 40% to 50%.  On the
other hand, a broadened definition of the “core work” that must be done by
government depots served to offset the benefits to private contractors of their
percentage increase.
On October 28, the House passed the conference report by a vote of 286 to 123.
On the following day, the Senate debated the conference report’s provisions regarding
depot maintenance operations at length, but did not move to a final vote.  A bid by
Senator Kay Hutchison to postpone a final vote on the FY1998 defense authorization
until January 18, 1998 was denied.  On November 6, the Senate reached final
agreement, passing the conference report by a vote of 90 to 10.  President Clinton
signed the bill into law on November 18 (P.L. 105-85).
DOD Report on Costs and Savings
In the FY1998 defense authorization act cited above, Congress included
language (Section 2824) that prohibited DOD from taking any concrete steps towards
planning and implementing new base closures until it had submitted a report on “costs
and savings attributable to the first four rounds of closure and realignment; and on the
need, if any, for additional rounds.”   The detailed requirements set forth in the
Dorgan Amendment appeared quite daunting, including ten “Elements” and eight
“Methods of Presenting Information.”  The deadline for delivery of the report was set
for “no later than the President’s submission to Congress of the budget for FY2000”
(January-February 1999).
On April 2, 1998, far in advance of the deadline, the Department of Defense
submitted its report to Congress.7  Secretary of Defense Cohen, in his introductory
statements, stressed several key points in calling for new base closure and realignment
legislation in the current year.  He stated that the base structure was, currently, 23%
in excess of what was needed, and that savings from two new rounds of closings
would provide vital funding for modernization of weapons systems and improved
readiness.  He reminded Congress that while the defense budget was down 40% and
force structure 36%, base structure had declined only 21%.  He cited several other
examples of the significant imbalance between force and base structures.  The number
of Navy ships was scheduled to drop by 46% between 1989 and 2003; while berthing
space would decline by only 18%.   The number of Army soldiers was slated to fall
43% in the same period, compared with only a 7% planned reduction in classroom
space.
The base closure report, in providing information requested by Congress in
Section 2824, claimed that the closure costs of the 1988 and 1993 rounds were less
than the Pentagon’s original estimate.  It asserted that the costs of the 1991 and 1995
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rounds, when completed, would be roughly equal to the estimates.  The report
claimed that the resulting savings from the shutdown of bases and facilities during
BRAC’s 1988-1995 rounds would exceed initial estimates.  More specifically, DOD
expected net total savings of about $14 billion through 2001.  Annual savings,
thereafter, were estimated at $5.6 billion.
The two new rounds of closures in 2001 and 2005 sought by the Pentagon were
expected to produce, after implementation, additional savings of about $3 billion a
year.  As required by Congress in Section 2824, both CBO and GAO were to review
and comment on the accuracy and reliability of the report’s findings.  Other significant
features of the  base closure report included: (1) a recommendation by DOD to apply
the model of previous independent base closure commissions for the two rounds
proposed for 2001 and 2005; and (2) a statement touting the successful economic
recovery from base closures of many impacted communities.
A subsequent Air Force memo (April 26) added fuel to the controversy over
base closures.  The memo cited John D. Podesta, the White House deputy chief of
staff, as having tried through a DOD official, to encourage Lockheed Martin
Corporation to go after some of the depot maintenance work at McClellan Air Force
Base and keep the work in Sacramento.8  Members adamantly opposed to keeping
depot maintenance work at both McClellan AFB and Kelly AFB accused the
Administration of continuing to meddle in the base closure process.  The level of
suspicion increased, as did the level of rhetoric, with Members issuing forceful
statements in opposition to new base closures, such as “dead on arrival,”“smoking
gun,” and “over my dead body.”
Reaction on Capitol Hill to the April 2, 1998 report’s call for two new base
closure rounds was similar to that of the previous year -- strong and widespread
resistance.  The House National Security Committee  remained broadly opposed to
any closings in the near future.  This degree of opposition was mirrored also in the
House as a whole.  The Senate Armed Services Committee was more evenly divided
on the issue than the House committee.  In its mark-up session, the Senate committee
defeated by a 10-8 margin a proposed new round of base closures in 2001 (press
release dated May 8, 1998).  Sen. John McCain and Sen. Carl Levin,  principal co-
sponsors of new BRAC legislation the previous year (as well as in 1997), indicated
that they were prepared, however, to seek support for passage of a floor amendment
during Senate consideration of the FY1999 defense authorization bill (S. 2057/S.
2060).  In the end, with sentiment of the majority clearly running against them, the
Senators abandoned their initiative.
In floor action (June 25), the Senate voted 48-45 in support of an amendment
to the FY1999 defense authorization bill that would have made it more difficult for
the Pentagon to move ahead with base closings.  Amendment No. 2981, sponsored
by Sen. James Inhofe, would have restricted the Administration from closing bases
with 225 or more civilian personnel (a reduction from the current threshold of 300 set
in law).  It would also have restricted the Pentagon from realigning bases with 750
civilian personnel, or more than “40% of the total number of civilian personnel
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authorized to be employed at such military installation.”  Further, the amendment
would have prevented the Pentagon from closing a base within four years after
completing a realignment of such base.  The intent of this provision was to delay, if
not block, the Department of Defense from quickly moving to close a particular base
by reducing the number of civilian employees to less than 225.  In addition, the Inhofe
amendment expressed congressional opposition to any new rounds of closures and
realignments until all actions from previous rounds had been completed.
The Inhofe amendment, ultimately, was dropped from the FY1999 defense
authorization bill during conference.
CBO and GAO Assessments
The Congressional Budget Office submitted its review of DOD’s base
realignment and closure report on July 1, 1998.9  It stated that the report provided
most, but not all, of the information that the Congress had requested.  It found DOD’s
estimates of savings from previous closure rounds, as fully implemented, consistent
with its own estimates:  $5.6 billion as compared to $5 billion.  However, CBO
explained that the firm measures of BRAC savings requested by the Congress “do not
 -- and cannot exist.”  It elaborated, as follows:
BRAC savings are really avoided costs -- costs that DOD would have incurred if
BRAC actions had not taken place.  Because those avoided costs are not actual
expenditures, DOD cannot observe them and record them in its financial records.
As a result, DOD can only estimate savings rather than actually measure them.
In its review, CBO observed that DOD’s report had provided a clear and
coherent summary of why future base closure rounds would produce significant
savings.  It noted, however, that DOD provided “little analysis of those data or insight
into the number and types of installations that might be closed in the event of future
BRAC rounds.”  Other significant CBO findings included:
An analysis of the likely impact of future base closures on local communities
cannot be attempted until the specific communities are identified; even then, it
would be very difficult to do.
DOD was unable to locate some of the requested data, including the original cost
and savings estimates that it gave to the BRAC commissions.
Estimates of BRAC costs and savings would be more accurate if they included
[DOD’s] environmental and caretaker costs for some bases after the six-year
implementation period is over.
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The General Accounting Office submitted its review of DOD’s report on
November 13, 1998.10  It was longer and provided more supporting detail than the
CBO review.  GAO gave DOD generally good grades.  It said that, overall, DOD had
provided most of the information required by Section 2824.  GAO affirmed that the
four previous BRAC closure rounds would result in substantial net savings.  It noted,
however, that “DOD’s report should be viewed as providing a rough approximation
of costs and savings rather than precise accounting.”  It pointed out that “DOD’s data
systems do not capture all savings associated with BRAC actions, nor has DOD
established a separate system to track BRAC savings.”  Other significant GAO
findings included:  
DOD’s analysis of operational and readiness indicators has shown no long-term
problems affecting military capabilities that can be related to BRAC actions.  This
general conclusion is also consistent with our prior work.
DOD’s report emphasizes that communities affected by prior BRAC actions
appear to be rebounding economically.  We also have found this to be the case,
although our work also shows that some communities are faring better than others.
DOD’s report suggests that proposed BRAC rounds in 2001 and 2005 would be
conducted like prior rounds.  DOD’s legislative proposal  requesting authority to
conduct two additional BRAC rounds provides a good starting point for
considering future legislation, should the Congress decide to authorize additional
rounds.
Closures and the 106th Congress
A “front-burner” issue for Congress at the outset of the 106th Congress was
whether to authorize a new round of base closings.  At a November 1998 American
Bar Association symposium on national security, the general counsel of the Senate
Armed Services Committee predicted that: “There will be a significant attempt to put
BRAC in the FY2000 authorization bill, which may well succeed.”11  On January 20,
1999, Sen. John McCain, along with Sen. Carl Levin, sponsored a bill (S. 258) calling
for two new rounds in 2001 and 2003. In support of the bill, Sen. McCain pointed to
the 23% excess capacity in  infrastructure claimed by DOD, and said that it was
“unconscionable” for anyone to avoid looking at the billions of dollars to be saved by
closing and realigning more bases.  In an effort to win support, he and his cosponsors
offered two significant changes in the law.  First, the whole BRAC selection process
would begin and finish two months later in calendar year 2001 than in previous
rounds.  It would give a new President the opportunity to nominate members of a
base closure commission.  Second, privatization-in-place would not be permitted in
closing installations unless the new base closure commission explicitly recommended
it. 
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Secretary of Defense William Cohen stressed, at almost every opportunity during
the early part of the year, the importance of further base closures.  In speaking to the
Illinois legislature on January 28, 1999, he stated that the most politically challenging
aspect of his effort to improve DOD efficiency and save money was base closures.
He said:
I know that BRAC is now seen as a four-letter word, but I must tell
you that the vast sums of money we waste on unneeded facilities is
robbing our men and women in uniform of needed training, modern
weapons, and a better quality of life. .... The two additional rounds we
will fight for this year will ultimately save $20 billion [during
implementation] and generate $3 billion annually [thereafter].
Despite such appeals, many Members of Congress remained opposed to new
rounds, at least for the time-being, because of widespread fear among constituents
over such closings.  This was underscored in hearings on February 2 before the House
Armed Services Committee (formerly, House National Security Committee), when
Secretary of Defense Cohen’s call for two more closure rounds reportedly received
a “cool response.”  More ominously, from the Pentagon’s perspective, the Senate
Armed Services Committee voted on May 12 and 13 against authorizing any new
rounds of closings during its mark-up of the FY2000 defense authorization bill (S.
1059).  On May 26, the full Senate rejected a last-ditch effort by Sen. John McCain
and Sen. Carl Levin to revive their base closure initiative during floor debate and
passage of the defense bill.  The 60 to 40 vote marked the third year in a row that
DOD’s attempt to win support in the Senate committee to shut down more bases had
been blocked.  With opposition to base closures even stronger in the House, most
observers believed that DOD’s high priority initiative had been effectively “squashed”
for the remainder of the year -- if not longer.
In the second session of the 106th Congress, the Administration’s FY2000 DOD
budget proposal sought authority to close more military bases in the years 2003 and
2005.  Deputy Defense Secretary John Hamre emphasized that it was a particularly
opportune time for Congress to take the initiative since the national economy was  so
strong.  In an effort to win the support of Congress, Secretary of Defense Cohen said
that the base closing process needed to be improved -- that there were too many
bureaucratic obstacles in the transition to private use of a closed base.  Also, he
contended that the failure to close more bases would cost the Pentagon as much as
$20 billion that could be better spent on upgrading and building new weapon systems,
as well as increasing the performance levels of U.S. fighting forces.  He  also pledged
that politics would not be permitted to intrude in any future base closure rounds.
Congress, however, chose not to authorize any new rounds of closures in the
year 2000.  In floor debate, on June 7, 2000, the Senate defeated an amendment to
the FY2001 defense authorization bill, once again sponsored by Sen. McCain and
Sen. Levin. The amendment, which would have authorized two new rounds in 2003
and 2005, was rejected by a vote of 63 to 35.  The positions of the opposing sides in
the debate reflected the same concerns expressed in previous years.
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Closures and the 107th Congress
 
One of the Department of Defense’s top agenda items in the early stages of the
107th Congress is to secure authority for additional military base closures and
realignments.  On February 27, 2001, Senator John McCain and Senator Carl Levin
introduced a bill (S. 397) to authorize two new rounds of base closures in 2003 and
2005.  The Taxpayers for Common Sense (TCS), a national budget watchdog
organization, immediately applauded the initiative and said that “it would save billions
for other important defense priorities.”  It estimated the cost of maintaining excess
military bases at about $3.6 billion each year, and said that projected Pentagon savings
could amount to as much as $21 billion through 2015 if the military were allowed to
close bases in 2003 and 2005.12
A more cautious view, however, was expressed by Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison
in an editorial article in the Austin, TX Austin American-Statesman on March 29,
2001.  She noted a trend toward increasing restrictions on U.S. military training in
locations abroad, such as Germany, Okinawa, Korea, and Puerto Rico, and she
suggested that it “cast into doubt the wisdom of prematurely closing more domestic
military bases.”  She also drew attention to the fact that some BRAC decisions, such
as at Reese Air Force Base and Fort Hood, are now regarded as having been
mistakes.  In the case of the latter installation, the BRAC decision has been essentially
reversed. 
In another development, Rep. Vic Snyder introduced a bill on May 10, 2001
(H.R. 1820) that seeks a new base closure round in 2003, but calls for the Department
of Defense to designate a list of “core” military installations as essential to national
security and, therefore, immune from any BRAC-type action.13  The list would be
limited to half of all military bases.  The proposed bill represents a major procedural
change from prior BRAC rounds, whereby all military bases and activities were
eligible to be closed or realigned.
Conclusion
The climate on Capitol Hill appears to be more amenable to a new round of base
closures this year than at any time in the recent past. This may be, in large part, due
to the change of Administrations.  However, if past experience repeats itself, DOD
and other advocates of new closures will confront stiff opposition from those who are
concerned about the likely, if not inevitable, dislocations caused by closing bases.
Some observers, also, believe that Congress has only a brief period of time to muster
the support needed to establish a new, independent commission.  Any extended delay
by Congress that moves a BRAC decision closer to the 2004 presidential election, it
is widely thought,  risks the possibility of gradually dwindling support and possible
failure.
